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Abstract: From initially defining new governance processes as external to “traditional” forms 
of EU law, a number of academic scholars have begun to argue that methods like the OMC can 
be seen as indicative of a broader “transformation” of European law-making. The 
transformation thesis relies on seeing the OMC as an evolving legal mechanism, in which 
features such as peer review, and the participation of 'new' constitutional actors, can take the 
place of traditional forms of legal accountability and participation. 
At the same time, the transformation thesis remains empirically under-developed. Taking the 
new streamlined OMC process in social inclusion and social protection as its starting point, 
this paper will seek to remedy that gap. The paper evaluates the transformation thesis using 
interview data gained from the recent Commission evaluation of the OMC SPSI (conducted 
from 2005-2006). While the OMC SPSI displays evidence for a number of its features – it also 
displays some of the limits of the ‘transformation’ idea.  
While the OMC as it stands indicates elements of a more ‘dynamic’ form of accountability and 
subsidiarity in the EU order, its lack of critical review and transparency, and failure to include 
local or regional actors casts doubt on its suitability as a replacement for traditional legal 
accountability mechanisms. As much as ‘transformation’ may offer an attractive future for EU 
law, its dynamic vision for open coordination remains largely unrealised. 
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1. Introduction   
While political scientists have divided their attention to the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) between issues of legitimacy on the one hand and effectiveness on the other, lawyers 
have tended to approach the question of the OMC from the first legitimacy-based perspective. 
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spelled-out in this paper), is the move to open coordination in employment, social inclusion 
and other fields a legitimate one? It is easy to answer this question in the negative. Lacking 
proper mechanisms of judicial review, and severing the links between publicly-elected 
Parliaments and the execution of public policy (at EU and national levels), the OMC can easily 
be conceptualised as a threat to the legitimacy and place of EU law-making (Joerges 2007; 
Hatzopoulos 2007). The method seems to represent a trade-off between legitimacy and 
effectiveness; a means of driving the integration process forward in the social field, precisely 
through leaving traditional legal safeguards – “the rule of law” in Europe – behind.  
At the same time, recent years have seen the development of an alternative body of literature 
(Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002; Sabel and Simon; 2006; Scott and Sturm 2007; Sabel and Zeitlin 
2008). This literature posits methods like the OMC not as a second-best alternative to more 
robust forms of law-making, but as part of a “transformative moment” in our very 
understanding of European law. Under the transformative view, the method’s seeming 
sacrifice of values of uniformity and stability in law-making is not seen as imperilling a 
European understanding of legality, but instead as representing a renewal of two features –
accountability and subsidiarity – central to the legitimacy of all forms of European law-
making. In promoting a more dynamic and de-centralised form of rule, methods like the OMC 
may not only contest concepts like legality and legitimacy, but also point towards a significant 
re-formulation of their meaning.  
While this literature may offer an exhilarating glance towards the future of EU law in a 
broader sense, it also leaves significant questions unanswered. The most significant – to be 
addressed in this paper – is the lack of examples indicating a genuine effort to apply the core 
tenets of “transformation” to the practice of EU governance. This paper will attempt to carry-
out this task through an assessment of the everyday operation of a particular OMC process –
the OMC in Social Protection and Social Inclusion (OMC SPSI). This process was created in 
2006 through the “streamlining” of a more long-standing process for the coordination of social 
inclusion policies (operating from 2000), and two separate open coordination strands – for 
pension (from 2001) and for health and long-term care (from 2004)) (Commission 2005).  
The main source of information in its assessment will be the evaluation of the OMC carried-
out by the Commission from 2005 to 2006 (Commission 2006). The evaluation consisted of an 
extensive questionnaire sent by the Commission’s DG for Employment and Social Affairs to 
the labour and social affairs ministries of the participating national governments, as well as 
selected trans-national NGO’s, Social Partners and Local Authorities (with a track record of 
involvement in the OMC SPSI through its supporting “Community Action Programme” –
PROGRESS). The questionnaire asked its respondents, through a series of closed questions, as 
well as an open one, to give their opinions about two processes – the OMC processes in social 
inclusion, and in pensions. Responses were received from all 25 of the governments then 
participating in the OMC, as well as 11 European “umbrella” organizations of social NGOs, 4 
social partner organizations, and 3 organizations representing regional and local authorities. 
These responses, while not exhaustive, offer a series of insights into the views of the method’s 
most influential policy actors.  
The responses will be evaluated in three steps.  
z While the paper’s second part (s2) will outline the transformation thesis,  
z the third part (s3) will evaluate the claim that the OMC is forging a “dynamic” vision of 
accountability in the EU.  
z Finally, the paper’s fourth part (s4) will ask whether the OMC SPSI as it stands is 
capable of respecting, or even radicalising, the principles of “subsidiarity” in the EU 
order.  
The limits and promise of the transformation view will be assessed in the paper’s conclusion 
(s5).  
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legal implications of the rise of “new governance” in the EU, there are significant gaps 
between its vision of a bottom-up and de-centered form of law-making and the realities of the 
OMC SPSI. As much as the OMC – in its abstract design – may offer an attractive future for 
those seeking an alternative to hierarchical legal programmes, it has not yet succeeded in re-
creating the mechanisms of political accountability and local involvement to which 
“transformation” literature aspires.  
2. The Transformation Thesis   
The transformation thesis shares much in common with a number of other normative accounts 
of EU governance. It significantly relies, for example, on a deliberative conception of the EU 
polity; one in which the processes of new governance have the potential to significantly alter 
the perceptions of state and non-state actors (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Eriksen and Fossum 
2002). It also shares something in common with Fritz Scharpf’s conception of “input”
legitimacy i.e. that decisions can be considered legitimate “if and because they reflect ‘the will 
of the people’ – that is, they can be derived from the authentic preferences of a political
community” (Scharpf 1999: 6). It is therefore not completely alien to existing governance 
literature in the social sciences.  
There are two distinct elements, however, that are different. Firstly, the transformation thesis 
carries a different object of analysis – the fate and development of EU law. Secondly, it 
emerges from a different theoretical background – the debate, in the US, over experimentalist 
or pragmatist approaches to law (Dorf and Sabel 1998; Simon 2004). While there is little space 
here to describe these differences in any depth, they constitute the distinct contribution of 
“transformation” literature to the debate over new governance in the EU.  
Experimentalist theory approaches methods like the OMC by highlighting a basic 
dissatisfaction with existing attempts to conceptualise the relationship between “new 
governance” and traditional forms of EU law. Perhaps the most popular view of that relation is 
the idea that the OMC should be seen as an “extra-legal” process (Scott and Trubek 2002; de 
Burca 2003). This external view of the law-governance relationship suggests that both the 
strengths and limits of the method rest upon its distance from law traditionally understood. In 
terms of strengths, this means that the OMC can be a useful instrument in filling legislative 
“gaps” closed-off by the strict decision-making hurdles of the EC Treaty (Scharpf 2003: 654; 
Zeitlin 2005). In terms of limits, it suggests that the OMC is a “second-best solution”; 
comparatively “weak” when contrasted with the EU’s normal legislative instruments (Scharpf 
2003: 655; Commission 2001: 22). In both cases, the OMC should be understood as something 
working at the periphery of legal integration (as either a supplement or threat to ordinary legal 
methods).  
The transformation thesis approaches the law-governance relationship from precisely the 
opposite direction. Rather than see the relationship between law and governance as 
antithetical, the transformation thesis argues that processes like the OMC stand as a window 
onto the future of EU law (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008: 323-327). The development of new 
governance – so these theorists argue – does not exist as a parallel process of “political”
integration (and hence as a transient and less important stage of the integration process), but 
precisely provides evidence that EU law has reached a new turning point.  
Rather than act as a series of static, uniform and hierarchical rules, underlined by a clear 
distinction between different levels of governance, the transformation literature argues that the 
EU is developing as an “experimentalist” legal regime, in which legislative power is pooled 
and shared between legal actors (Sabel & Zeitlin 2008, Gerstenberg & Sabel 2002). Through 
its emphasis on procedural frameworks, and broad goals to be applied flexibly in different state 
contexts, the field of new governance is changing our very understanding of law and its most 
basic processes, institutions and values, just as law itself is conditioning how processes like the 
OMC operate. As de Burca and Scott have put it, “law, as a social phenomena is necessarily 
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and operates within the context of a normative order of law” (de Burca & Scott 2006: 16).  
The reasons underlying this change concern the evolving nature of the EU’s primary 
regulatory challenges. Not only is the EU buffeted by forces of globalization and exchange that 
have made the transfer of people, capital and technology more rapid than ever, but it is also 
territorially and horizontally divided – in the first case, into a multitude of national legal 
orders, and in the second, into a series of specialist discourses (in competition policy, energy, 
telecommunications, fiscal reform, and a host of other areas) (Scheuerman 2001).  
This division makes the guiding ideal of EU law – to produce uniform and stable rules, 
establishing a common regulatory framework across the EU polity in particular areas –
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. To take social policy – as the most relevant example –
while a model of common law-making may be the most simple solution to problems of
“regulatory competition” between states, any attempt to establish minimum common social
standards across the EU faces the hurdle of on the one hand, significant diversity between 
European welfare regimes, and on the other, frequent changes in national social preferences 
(Scharpf 2003: 649-652). Given this diversity, achieving agreement on “foundational” norms 
(often under conditions of unanimity) is likely to prove difficult. There is simply no uniform 
and stable basis in the field of social policy on which to construct common, balanced or fixed 
rules.  
One response to this new environment is to pre-suppose that it erodes the very basis of the 
“rule of law” or “proper” law-making. The shift to methods like the OMC challenges a 
traditional (or “thin”) definition of legality (Möllers 2006: 316-317). In promoting flexible and 
evolving “standards”, subject to constant review and revision, the OMC undermines the
commitment of the EU to prospective legal rules, that are to apply equally to all European 
citizens (regardless of their country of origin). Furthermore, in excluding the supervision by 
the ECJ, and the input of the European Parliament, the method potentially runs foul of 
“thicker” definitions of legality too; those that see a role for law in connecting executive 
conduct to popular decision-making or control (Scheuerman 2004: 110-114, Duina & Raunio 
2007). The severing of traditional links of political and legal accountability could thus be seen 
as a threat to the nature of the EU as a ‘law-bound’ polity (Joerges 2007).  
At the same time, one can see the method, and other new governance processes, as re-
evaluating the very concepts (of legality and the rule of law) that “new governance” has been 
said to be making redundant. This applies to two features in particular. The first of these is 
accountability. While traditional, hierarchical forms of accountability are challenged through 
the method, the transformation thesis argues that new horizontal or “dynamic” forms are 
emerging in their place. Under the OMC, the iterative nature of structures of national reporting 
and peer review make holding actors to an a priori defined legislative mandate impossible. 
The very purpose of a reporting cycle is to use “local” practice as an opportunity to re-frame 
“central” goals and norms. Actors are thus being held accountable for standards that are
constantly evolving (e.g. as political preferences, and the coalition of relevant actors involved, 
change).  
At the same time, the nature of peer review holds out the possibility of establishing new 
accountability relationships. Here, actors are accountable on a “dynamic” basis, to standards 
and expectations that evolve as national preferences, and social structures, change. Under this 
model, we are not accountable upwards to an original purposive “mission”, or to an ultimate 
legislative superior (of which, in the EU, there is none), but accountable side-ways, to other 
state and non-state actors, who share a mutual interest in ensuring that all policy actors takes 
common procedural and political commitments seriously (Sabel and Simon 2006: 400; Sabel 
and Zeitlin 2008: 276-277).  
This suggests that the OMC SPSI contains a robust and transparent peer review structure. In 
terms of robustness, it implies that national administrators do not simply use peer review 
committees or other bodies to “exchange opinions” (although this may in itself be an important 
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and either contest or demand explanations from others. In terms of transparency, it implies that 
peer review is not a closed circle, but an institution whose operations are open to external 
scrutiny. As Mark Bovens has argued, while a transparent form of review is unlikely of itself 
to be sufficient to satisfy demands for public accountability in EU governance, it is difficult to 
imagine meeting its requirements without it (Bovens 2007: 107). How can states be held 
accountable on a “dynamic” basis if their activities are covered in a cloud of secrecy, or if the 
range of “accounting” actors is an “insiders club”, insulated from external review (Harlow and 
Rawlings 2007)? In the OMC context, “dynamic accountability” also seems to imply a degree 
of procedural openness – that actors do not simply justify their positions, but that others (e.g. 
other governments, or participants of organised civil society), have the necessary information 
to evaluate those justifications. While one can see why such a “dynamic” model may be 
alluring to such a diverse environment as European social policy, one of the functions of the 
next section will be to enquire whether the basic pre-conditions of this “dynamic 
accountability” appear in practice.  
The second feature which “transformation” sees new governance and the OMC as reforming 
concerns  subsidiarity.  As a legal principle, subsidiarity was defined under the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Traditionally, it means that the Community is able to take action:  
“Only if and so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved by the Community” (Treaty of Amsterdam 2007: Art. 5).  
It represents – at least in its official incantations – the idea that power should be exercised as 
closely to the lives of EU citizens as possible. Part of the claim of the transformation thesis is 
that the OMC is capable not only of respecting this principle, but of radicalizing it. Whereas 
subsidiarity, under its earlier definitions, only refers to the need to hand power back to national 
governments, the method could go further, both devolving power to local and non-
governmental actors, and using their input and political strategies to inform the formulation of 
goals, indicators and objectives at the “central” or EU level (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008: 273-274). 
This also implies particular conditions. Firstly, it suggests that there is, in the method, a 
devolution of legislative power. It would imply, in the concrete case of the OMC SPSI, that 
those bodies with the competence in the domestic sphere to enact and frame social inclusion 
policies (often local and regional bodies) actually have a say in how “European” objectives are 
to be re-framed in a more local context (that they are not simply forced to apply rules of which 
they are in no sense authors). Only in this way can the unique experience and information that 
they hold inform the choices and preferences of the policy community as a whole.  
Secondly, it would imply that local “experiments” “feed-in” to the way in which “central”
rules or overall objectives and indicators are formulated. It is important for the model not just 
that power is shifted downwards, but that local experience is used, and taken seriously as a 
means of creating a more legitimate, effective and responsible EU-level strategy – that there is 
what we might call a “reflexive loop” between overall objectives and national efforts to meet 
them (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002: 291-292; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008: 274). While these two 
features do not exhaust the many complex aspects of transformation literature, they may 
represent two of its most important constitutive elements.  
What though are we to make of them? Their advantage is that they potentially explain 
examples of inter-change or “hybridity” between methods like the OMC and other parts of 
European law (Trubek, Cottrel and Nance 2006; Trubek and Trubek 2005). “Transformation”
sees EU law not in the stylised manner of much literature on new governance – as a fixed, 
static and uniquely authoritative standard - but as itself a “moving object”. The transformation 
thesis thus marks a radical effort to re-imagine both law and governance in the EU in light of 
the distinct conditions of the European polity. It sees new governance not as external to law, 
but as part of a process where other parts of EU law too (e.g. the development of framework 
directives, the move to a social dialogue in employment policy) are also changing.  
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assumed, rather than subjected to robust empirical testing or scrutiny. While the transformation 
thesis has been applied to a plethora of different fields (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008), we have seen 
little of the “micro-analyses” that (a number of) the papers of this issue have tried to conduct. 
We have to ask – when we remove “transformation” from the ether of experimentalist theory 
and apply its dominant features to a particular process – the OMC SPSI – do its radical claims 
about EU law still stand?  
The next sections of this paper will attempt to remedy this deficit through applying the two 
concepts of accountability and subsidiarity – as they have been developed in experimentalist 
literature – to the development and practice of social protection and inclusion. As we will see, 
in this practical realm, while the evidence for a changing role for EU law is very real, the 
experience of the OMC SPSI to date may undermine some of the basic assumptions – about 
creating a more flexible, participatory and accountable form of rule – that underlie the 
transformation model.  
3. Accountability and Peer Review   
One of the outcomes of Wim Kok’s influential review of the Lisbon Strategy (conducted in
2004) was a rejection of a more prescriptive strategy for the OMC’s development. It was 
agreed that – while Lisbon suffered from a major “implementation gap” – the way to overcome 
it was through peer review and learning rather than “naming and shaming” (Kok’s initial 
suggestion), or any other subtly coercive method. The “streamlined” OMC SPSI which Kok 
bequeathed has thus uniquely relied on peer review as a means of encouraging states to both 
follow the process and undertake substantive policy changes.  
This reliance has been on a divided peer review structure. Peer review is undertaken firstly, on 
an inter-governmental basis through both the Social Protection Committee (SPC), and the 
inter-governmental discussions leading to the Commission and Council’s adoption of its 
annual Joint Reports. In both of these procedures, national plans for social inclusion and 
protection reform are scrutinised in closed meetings of national representatives as well as 
selected Commission officials.  
Secondly, peer review is conducted through the OMC SPSI’s official Peer Review and 
Assessment programme. This programme is sponsored through the Community Action
Programme for Social Solidarity – “PROGRESS”, and is designed to allow ‘concrete’
examples of best practice found in particular member states to be reviewed and disseminated 
in a more in depth manner (through around 6 to 8 thematic meetings per year). Country peer 
reviews represent, in effect, the OMC’s official “day out”, with national representatives (and 
select invited NGO participants) visiting a country experimenting with a policy solution 
deemed to be innovative or exportable to other national contexts (in 2008, examples included 
active inclusion, social impact assessment, and the return of women to the labour market).  
The “dynamic” hope for these peer review institutions is that they can foster a new (horizontal) 
accountability relation. While internally, they can encourage member states to consider or 
internalise the expectations and demands of other states (Dawson 2009); externally, they may 
force states to justify policy failures, or their inability to meet common European objectives. 
Some of the existing empirical literature bears out this optimism (Horvath 2007: 64-65; 
Jacobsson 2003: 15-17). As Kerstin Jacobsson (analysing Nordic cases) has described it:  
“Externally, the OMC does exert a certain pressure on the Member States. As a minimum,
governments have to actively defend their positions if they are not willing to conform to the 
common norms and they have to ‘think twice’ before introducing measures that go against 
[these] norms.” (Jacobsson 2005: 133)  
One wonders, however, whether, in the case of the OMC SPSI, this conclusion still holds. The 
responses commonly re-conceptualise the role of peer review in the OMC. Most states, rather
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countries, see their “central goal” as mutual learning, or the exchange of policy information
(e.g. Latvia 2005: 8 (1); Netherlands 2005: 6; Slovenia 2005: 5; Slovakia 2005: 5). While on 
the one hand, the country peer reviews are viewed as opportunities to learn from, or adapt, 
foreign practices, on the other, the primary benefit of the SPC is considered in terms of the 
informal administrative networks between officials that it has created (Austria 2005: 6; Finland 
2005: 8. See also, Horvath 2007: 56). The goal is not “dynamic accountability” – or indeed any 
other form of accountability relation – but either mutual learning, or the creation of informal 
contacts between officials. As the government of the Netherlands put it:  
“The Netherlands view is that peer reviews, seminars and conferences help to promote mutual
learning and discuss the operation of the OMC. However, a peer review is only successful if 
Member States are allowed to critically assess each others plans.” (Netherlands 2005: 6)  
The objectives of the peer review process, set out in its “operational guide”, reflect this:  
“It is important to note that the Peer Review programme is not based on competition, but
should be regarded as an invitation to discover and exchange the wealth of experiences and 
good practices available at member state level, and to explore their applicability in other 
contexts.” (Commission 2008: 8)  
Similarly, the founding statute of the SPC (revised in 2004) clearly set-out its role as being one 
of facilitating mutual learning, rather than encouraging critical scrutiny or review of Member 
State practice (Council Decision 2004/689/EC: Art. 2). As a result, countries like Italy and the 
Netherlands see peer review as “watered down” (Italy 2005: 11), or successful “only when 
member states dare to be open, honest and critical to one another” (Netherlands 2005: 6). The 
practice of peer review in both structures to date reflects little of the “open exchange” of 
critical opinions that the dynamic model suggests.  
Instead, peer review often carries a different function. Following Kok’s message of 
“simplification”, national and joint reporting was significantly reformed from 2005 on. Under 
the 2007 “National Strategy Reports” (the now re-named National Action Plans, NAPs), 
member states were asked to identify particular areas of strategic priority for social protection 
and inclusion. These priority areas were then to be reported on in the next cycle, with thematic 
issues raised providing an agenda for later peer reviews and studies (for 2008, on child 
poverty, inequalities in health and longer working lives). An example of this cyclical process is 
the issue of “active inclusion” – a policy agenda identified as common to a number of member
states in the 2006 Joint Report, leading firstly to a public consultation (conducted in 2007), 
secondly to a stakeholders conference (on minimum income schemes, in June 2007) and 
finally to a formal Commission Communication on the subject (Commission 2007). Peer 
review and national reporting was used in this example firstly, to establish a policy consensus 
among the member states, and secondly, to push the issue firmly onto the European agenda.  
This example is indicative of how peer review and reporting function in a broader sense. Peer 
reviews rarely “review”. They do not aim – in the words of democratic experimentalism – to 
contest, demand justifications from, or “de-stabilise” settled policy decisions (Sabel and Zeitlin 
2008: 46-49). Instead they aim towards precisely the opposite – the identification of common 
approaches among different national contexts; approaches which can be “generalised” at the 
EU level, or exported to other countries (potentially providing a basis for common policy-
making in the future). While this process of policy formation or exchange could itself be 
useful, it falls significantly short of the demand for accountability and critical evaluation that 
the transformation literature suggests.  
Finally, the responses indicate two further factors that inhibit the possibility for a “dynamic”
form of accountability. The first is enlargement. The need for a Constitutional Treaty in 2003 
was often justified by governments on the basis that new institutional rules were needed to 
avoid decision-making paralysis in an enlarged Union. The responses indicate a concern that a 
similar problem could occur in the case of the OMC SPSI. Enlargement is seen by some 
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deliberative exchanges within peer reviews, more difficult. For the Finnish government, for 
example, “with the increased number of Member States, the [peer review] process has become 
heavier, and this limits the handling and capacity to make use of, information” (Finland 2005: 
5). For Denmark, enlargement makes the present process “unsustainable… it is more difficult 
to go into depth when so many countries meet at one time” (Denmark 2005: 7). Paradoxically, 
while enlargement may be one of the reasons behind the move to a more “flexible” form of 
policy-making in the first place, it may also stand precisely in the way of making “dynamic”
forms of accountability, based on peer review, a useful exercise (see also, on this point, 
Horvath 2007: 63-66).  
Lastly, dynamic accountability depends not only on actors who are willing to question and 
demand explanations from each other, but on a degree of transparency in the process. This 
basic level of transparency (e.g. one where the essential rules and participants of the process 
are clearly defined) also, however, seems to be lacking (see also, Kröger 2007: 576-579). 
Firstly, peer review procedures are seen by the respondents as closed and intransparent. Even 
states who are included in the process complain about the apparent contradiction between the
EU’s commitment to transparency and open access to documents contained in Article 255 of
the Treaty establishing the EC, and the secretive and inaccessible nature of meetings of the 
SPC (UK 2005: 18; Finland 2005: 10; Lithuania 2005: 10-11; Czech Republic 2005: 10). 
While one could defend this intransparency i.e. by arguing that it allows governments to admit 
to things that they would otherwise prefer to keep from public exposure, such a position is 
neither defended in the responses, nor is it broadly consistent with “transformation’s”
commitment to a more open, and less technocratic, form of rule.  
Second of all, the “reviewing” actors (in both the SPC, and the official peer assessment 
programme) tend to be national administrators and little else (Kröger 2006). This is a particular 
complaint among the social NGO respondents, all of whom raise complaints regarding their 
effective exclusion from peer review procedures (European Disability Forum, EDF 2005: 7; 
AGE 2005: 12-13; Eurochild 2005: 5; European Council of Municipalities and Regions,
CEMR 2005: 4). As Eurocities put it in their response, there may be a need, under peer review, 
for “more transparency regarding who is invited, how and why” (Eurocities 2005: 13). The 
case is put best by the Belgian authorities:  
“More than being an engine, the OMC is sometimes felt by some actors as an administrative
burden, and is not yet sufficiently anchored in practice on the ground. It remains too limited to 
a restrictive circle of responsible political and administrative ‘Europeanised’ officials, rather 
than those directly in charge of putting the OMC into practice at the national level.” (Belgium: 
12 Author’s translation).  
Rather than forge a broader “dynamic” accountability, the method has relied too frequently on
those already within the ‘inner circle’ of “Europeanised” participants (pan-European networks, 
national executives, and Commission officials). Given these limits, the method as it stands 
seems to have little to contribute to better realizing a more “dynamic” form of accountability in 
EU governance.  
4. Subsidiarity   
While we traditionally think of EU integration, and the agreement of EU laws, as a matter for 
bi-lateral negotiation between the European institutions and national federal governments,
social inclusion and protection policy is an area where an unprecedented degree of legislative 
and political power is held at local or regional levels. Of the 25 then member states consulted 
by the Commission in its 2005 review, considerable legislative competence in formulating and 
implementing social inclusion and protection policy was held at local or regional levels in each 
and every state (CEMR 2005). To take social assistance policies as an example i.e. to define 
social inclusion only in “minimal” rather than “multi-dimensional” terms, this area is a 
primary competence for local or regional authorities in 15 member states. In the others,
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municipal levels. It is thus little more than stating the obvious to say that this field is a 
particularly pressing area for the principle of subsidiarity to apply. A failure to properly 
involve local authorities (who have precisely the capacity to implement social inclusion’s most 
significant objectives) could not only impair the OMC’s legitimacy, but deprive it of the input 
of the very actors who can remedy the EU’s primary social challenges (Büchs and Friedrich 
2005: 259).  
In addressing the question of local participation, the responses to the Commission evaluation 
offer some initial optimism (see also, Zeitlin 2005: 466-468). Each and every national 
respondent reports some level of local involvement, ranging from the ubiquitous model of a 
working group, coordinated by a national labour or social affairs ministry, and including non-
governmental and local organisations in the drawing-up of national plans (used by 13 
respondents) to more direct efforts to delegate responsibility downwards. As an example of the 
latter, the Spanish government, in its response, draws attention to three different levels of actor 
participation (Spain 2005: 7-8). At the federal level, cross-departmental coordination is 
facilitated by an inter-ministerial Commission, while at the local level, the Commission for 
social services within the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Regions has been given 
specific responsibility to monitor, review and report upon regional and local policy. A further 
body – the “Working Group for Social Inclusion and Employment” – is entrusted with 
fostering civil society involvement.  
Opportunities for local and regional participation in national reporting have particularly 
emerged under certain conditions. While in “older” EU members, procedures for legislative 
consultation are often well established, or based on corporatism, the Joint Inclusion 
Memorandum, signed by the accession states in 2004 indicates a different picture in newer 
member states. There is a recognition that many states have emerged from a heavily “top-
down” tradition in managing government policy. Local and non-governmental involvement 
“had tended to be limited or haphazard” (Commission 2004: 36). The OMC was thus 
introduced in these countries at a time of transition for their political and decision-making 
culture.  
While this transition period presents the method with significant challenges, it may also have 
provided a window of opportunity for the method to influence policy-making practice (for an 
extension of this idea in the Belgian context, see Vanhercke this issue). For two NGO 
organisations, ATD 4th World and AGE, the process had succeeded in “creating a whole new 
dynamic, bringing different people and groups together both horizontally and vertically” (ATD 
4th World 2005: 2-3). Similarly, a number of national respondents in the newer member states
indicate that the further development of the OMC SPSI has incentivised them to develop new 
participatory structures (Hungary 2005: 6; Czech Republic 2005: 5-6). Here, the method can 
be seen as something of an “opportunity structure” for the local level; a chance to forge new 
relationships in an environment where the domestic constitutional space is unsettled. This 
opportunity may not only arise in the post-Communist East, but also in states undergoing a 
period of contestation between federal and regional authorities (Belgium 2005: 2-3; Italy 2005: 
5).  
Such optimism, however, is far from ubiquitous. The most common view from the respondents 
is that the lack of extensive local and regional participation is one of the primary obstacles to 
both the method’s effectiveness and its legitimacy. 12 respondents voice this complaint. To
give one example, CEMR reports that:  
“The experience from the first rounds of the NAPs on social inclusion have revealed that,
while central governments have stepped-up their efforts to consult with the regional level, in 
most cases, this consultation process has not been formalised and rarely allows genuine 
consultations from regions to the design and delivery of anti-poverty measures.” (CEMR 2005: 
10)  
The lack of a proper formalisation of the process – in so much as it has allowed for a “flexible”
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the “gatekeepers” of local participation (and indeed of NGO involvement as well). While the
objectives and indicators of the process are agreed inter-governmentally (elaborated through 
committees in which local representatives and actors from civil society have no voice), the 
action undertaken to meet them is guided through national reports, which remain the 
prerogative of the federal government.  
In this context, rather than “transform” the bilateralism of traditional forms of agreeing 
European law, the method has simply extended that bilateralism into areas of policy where 
local authorities had often been the main drivers of social reform. While national governments 
are free to meet EU level objectives “as they see fit”, such a move – the ability to “frame”
national social inclusion policy, or make strategic decisions – in an environment where 
competences are held below the federal level, can centralise, rather than devolve, decision-
making power. At the same time, as a ‘non-binding’ procedure, local and regional 
governments lack the legal remedies necessary to contest their exclusion. In a first and 
important sense, local and regional authorities remain, under the OMC SPSI, “voluntarily 
consulted” actors, reliant on the good-will of their governments to both organise structures of 
local and non-governmental participation, and decide whether or not the contributions offered 
there are valuable enough to “feed-in” to national reports.  
Secondly, the responses indicate that the OMC SPSI’s participatory potential may have been 
limited by the very need to forge a more adaptive form of rule. One of the core features of the 
transformation approach is that it seeks to address the rapidly changing nature of regulatory 
challenges in the EU through encouraging flexibility in law-making. The embodiment of this 
feature in the OMC is the constant adaptation and iteration of national reports (the presence of 
a relatively short (one year) time-frame in which to draft, consult-upon and adopt National 
Action Plans).  
There may, however, be costs to this flexibility. While this time-frame may be an advantage 
for governments intent on “speeding-up” the legislative process, a vocal minority within the 
responses argue that the OMC has given-up on participation requirements precisely in order to 
guarantee greater ‘flexibility’ in its approach to regulatory reform (CEMR 2005: 5; Solidar 
2005: 4; Eurocities 2005: 5). Eurocities gives the example of the city of Copenhagen, which 
was given only 5 days to respond to the Danish NAP. Furthermore, numerous respondents 
indicate that the short time-frame for consultation has effectively foreclosed possibilities for 
scrutiny by national parliaments (AGE 2005: 11; Austria 2005: 5; European Anti-Poverty 
Network (EAPN) 2005: 6; Hungary 2005: 7; UK 2005: 17). Both of these exclusions can do 
little but contribute to the feeling that the procedure is dominated by executive actors, with 
little possibility for external influence.  
Where there is not exclusion, participation often comes at a point where its practical effect is 
limited. One of the most common complaints offered is that – where the consultation of key 
NGOs, and local authorities, is common practice – this has often occurred relatively late in the 
reporting process (EPSP 2005: 10; Malta 2005: 6; Hungary 2005: 7-8). In these cases, 
consultation only occurs after the strategic objectives and priorities of each plan have already
been set. In these circumstances, the dilemma of a more “flexible” form of policy-making 
becomes clear. Whereas on the one hand, “flexibility” is sought as a means of allowing access 
to new forms of knowledge, on the other, the constant drive for renewal may make public 
involvement more difficult (or alternatively, more selective).  
Lastly, the presence of significant local involvement is inhibited by the lack of reflexive links 
between local practice and the OMC SPSI’s “European dimension” (Preunkert and Zirra 2009: 
196-197). There is little indication, in the responses that local “practice” feeds-in to larger 
indicators and objectives (e.g. ATD 4th World 2005: 7; Solidar 2005: 5; EAPN 2005: 9). To 
take an example, the annual roundtables on Social Exclusion coinciding with the Spring 
European Council often includes local (e.g. the Committee of the Regions) and non-
governmental opinion normally excluded from EU-level processes. These events, and other 
seminars, expert studies, and trans-national exchanges, sponsored through “PROGRESS”, are 
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incentives for local, regional and NGO involvement (Czech Republic 2005: 6; Spain 2005: 9; 
Finland 2005: 7-8; European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 
UEAPME 2005: 5)  
Troublingly, the responses indicate that – while such institutions may have an important 
deliberative function – they often fail to produce any reflexive link between “local” and 
“European” priorities. The UK response notes that – while the roundtable has seen “a 
community of actors emerging” – “[it] has not been a consistently effective means of driving 
the process forward, or assisting the transition from process to outcome” (UK 2005: 18. See 
also CEMR 2005: 5). While “transformation” relies on the ability of local experience to foster 
a more responsive and more legitimate legal order, there is neither evidence of consistent local 
involvement, nor (where there is participation) of local input “feeding-up” into the process of 
framing “central” or EU objectives.  
To this extent, the promise of the transformation thesis – that new modes of governance like 
the OMC could empower a form of EU law that takes subsidiarity seriously – remains 
unfulfilled. The process – in the field of the OMC SPSI – remains one dominated by the bi-
lateral negotiations of national and European executives, rather than influenced by a wider set 
of local or “bottom-up” participation.  
5. Conclusion   
While the aspiration of transformation literature for the OMC is that it can bequeath not only a 
more effective, but also a more legitimate, model for European law, there is little evidence in 
the method’s practice to support this conclusion. While “transformation” relies on a number of 
legal values that new modes of governance like the OMC are said to be reforming, the practice 
of the OMC SPSI displays a quite different type of reform. This is represented not through a 
more accountable and participatory form of rule, but either a perverted or under-developed 
version of these principles.  
To take accountability as a first example, the method does indeed contain structures of 
horizontal review and scrutiny. Yet these structures are both designed, and used by 
administrative actors, as learning opportunities, rather than as a means to call other states 
“dynamically” to account. While this function may itself be important, the effectiveness of 
peer review has been further constricted by its confinement to a select group of explicitly 
“Europeanised” policy actors. Not only are traditional, hierarchical forms of accountability
diluted under the method, but there is little evidence of the multiplication or “broadening” of 
accountable actors upon which the transformation thesis relies. While we may therefore have a 
more “dynamic” form of rule, this dynamism could precisely inhibit the necessary procedural 
frameworks, and temporal space, within which adequate accountability relationships can arise. 
To take subsidiarity as a second example, here too, few of the normative aspirations of the 
transformation literature have been realised. While new structures of participation have arisen 
in certain contexts, these structures are manned by procedural “gatekeepers” at the national 
level. Local and regional governments – as the main “implementers” of EU level targets –
have no automatic right of “structural entry” into strategic discussions of social inclusion and 
protection policy, either at national or European levels (see, for a different view vis-a-vis the 
European Employment Strategy, López-Santana this issue). Furthermore, where local input is
evident, its capacity to feed back into, or “re-frame”, central practice is limited. The second 
great hope of “transformation” – that it could use the diversity of the European polity, and the 
presence of local involvement, as a spring-board to a more legitimate European order – also 
seems unfounded.  
Some would argue that these conclusions need not lead us to abandon the idea of 
“transformation” altogether. Perhaps – as Jonathan Zeitlin has suggested – a reflexive reform 
strategy for the OMC could remedy a number of these challenges (Zeitlin 2005; Zeitlin 2007). 
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and enforce participation requirements (as well as a greater commitment on the part of the 
Member States to acquiesce in such monitoring). It would also involve demands for greater 
transparency, and integration between, different peer review bodies like the SPC and EMCO. 
Such reforms – some of them tentatively suggested by a recent Commission Communication
(Commission 2008) – could help supply some of the surrounding infra-structure to make 
transformation feasible again.  
A second objection may be that – while problems of political accountability and local
participation may exist in the OMC SPSI – one cannot automatically generalise these findings 
from one field to another. Perhaps the main tenets of the transformation thesis are stronger, for 
example, in employment (where the EES, and its successor, the Integrated Guidelines for Jobs 
and Growth, carry a general Treaty basis) than in the highly under-prescriptive domain of 
social protection and inclusion policy.  
At the same time, important doubts remain. Even if greater participation rights e.g. a 
commitment to local involvement, and a more robust peer review system, were available to the 
OMC, important disparities of power between the various actors involved could lead to 
distorted outcomes (Kröger 2006: 12-13; Büchs 2008). With no firm procedural basis for the
method within the European Treaties, nor any indication of a political willingness on the part 
of the Commission to interfere in domestic constitutional structures, who could enforce or 
monitor participation requirements effectively? And would the Member States even agree to 
such a move? The constant clarion call of the Commission to deepen and broaden national 
reporting has been ongoing now for several OMC cycles, yet each call remains bound to the 
willingness of national governments to listen; and to take the commitment to a “reflexive 
OMC” seriously.  
The second objection may be more pressing. While the lack of legal competences for the EU in 
social inclusion and protection policy may leave few alternatives to the types of soft law and 
horizontal coordination that a process like the OMC SPSI embodies, the specific factors of 
other policy fields (in terms of the level of institutionalization of OMC procedures, and 
constellation of actors involved at national and EU levels) demands further empirical work. 
This paper should in this sense be seen as a beginning rather than end for such analysis.  
At the very least, it may be necessary to tone down the hyperbole with which both the OMC 
more broadly, and this particular section of its literature, has been greeted. The “lesson” of the 
OMC should not only be as an inspiration for reform of European law in a broader sense, but 
as a warning against the dangers of executive dominance and political alienation that lay 
dormant within the larger debate over “new governance” in the European Union. EU lawyers 
and policy-makers should take heed.  
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review stage. The usual disclaimer applies.  
(1) Where country names or abbreviations are included, these represent questionnaire respondents. The 
numbers attached represent page numbers in the relevant responses. 
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